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What does the future hold for Pennsylvania’s competitive energy markets?

As the PA PUC embarks on its investigation of the natural gas markets, what evidence can we discern about how the agency sees competitive energy markets and how those markets should evolve?

On August 21, 2014, the PUC issued a Tentative Order that identified a laundry list of issues that its Office of Competitive Market Oversight (“OCMO”) will be tasked with investigating. The list includes such items as the assignment of storage and pipeline capacity, tolerances/penalties for system balancing, customer education and switching timeframes, to name a few. However, the list is perhaps most notable for issues not included. There will be no discussion of the natural gas distribution companies (“NGDC”) exiting the merchant function and no discussion of standard offer referral programs.

Looking first at the issues that will be examined, many involve nuts and bolts operational issues. Capacity assignment, switching timeframes, access to on-system delivery points, and so on. Improvements in the efficiency and fairness of these aspects of the interaction between natural gas suppliers (“NGS”) and NGDCs will make the market more seamless, reduce costs for NGSs and potentially NGDCs, and will provide a better customer experience. All of these would be good outcomes, and I am not aware of any party that opposes taking a look to see what tweaks or even more substantial changes are needed. This operational focus– regulating the market and making sure the existing structure works as best it can – is something the PUC views as within its wheelhouse, an area of core competency.

Devoting time to competitive market operational details, however, diverts resources and attention from the larger issues that will decide whether Pennsylvania’s competitive market will endure and thrive. For now, at least, it appears the PUC wants nothing to do with any discussion of NGDCs exiting the merchant function. There could be several reasons for the Commission’s reticence, considering that only a few short years ago, the Commission appeared to be seriously considering programs in the electricity markets that could have transitioned many customers into the competitive market, and at least one electric distribution company was seriously considering a formal exit. One possible explanation is that the Commission has what golfers call a case of the “yips” — the inescapable feeling that you have lost your “game” which results, inexorably, in losing your game. The loss of confidence started with the abrupt manner in which the electric market RMI process was turned around at the last possible minute, dropping programs that would have transitioned many customers to competitive service. Last year’s “polar vortex,” which brought the PUC undeserved criticism for “allowing” a roiling of the retail electric markets, when the problem was a wholesale market issue, slowed forward progress even more. The fallout from that period is still being felt. The Commission promulgated regulations to police disclosure of variable rates; while House Consumer Affairs Committee Chairman Godshall wanted legislation that would have imposed rate regulation on “deregulated” retail EGS rates. The resulting, and rather public, falling out between Chairman Godshall and Commission Chairman Powelson seems to have made the PUC even more reluctant to take bold action. It seems clear that there simply is not the political will, and possibly not the political capital, to advance the deregulation agenda that the Commission clearly signaled in the past, especially in light of the impending gubernatorial election.

But neither the polar vortex aftermath nor politics explains why the PUC has shied away from at least examining whether standard offer programs, so successful in electric deregulation, should be used in natural gas retail choice programs. Standard offers were responsible for migrating many customers off of default service and into one year fixed rate electric contracts. Perhaps the Commission is taking a practical approach, waiting to see what happens at the transition when the one year electricity contracts expire to make sure that it has a handle on the issues that can crop up. Perhaps the Commission wanted to wait and see whom the voters pick on the first Tuesday in November, to see how things change across the street—if at all. Regardless, it may be that the very fact that the Commission chose to wait and see rather than move ahead with a program, even if doing so appears, by most accounts, to be rational, is a signal of a change in attitude at the PUC. More practical, less policy – at least for now. The recent focus on the passage of House Bill 939, the re-authorization of Chapter 14, which also includes the authorization for the Commission to assess NGSs and EGSs, may be further evidence of this approach.

What does all this mean for the future of energy markets, natural gas and electricity, in Pennsylvania? In the short term it probably means that the Commission will appear to be unwilling to go down the road of opening the natural gas RMI proceeding to include issues related to merchant function exit, even if the enabling legislation expressly provides for such a result. It means the RMI will remain focused on operational issues. In the electricity markets, it appears unlikely that there will be any new proceedings to address the competitive market, at least until people stop holding their collective breath over concern about the potential repeat of last winter’s extreme run-up in wholesale prices. In other words, nuts and bolts are fine, but let’s not get into any policy fights just now.

In the long term, things may be more hopeful for those seeking change in the structure of the retail energy markets, if we can put the remnants of the recent past behind us and step out from under the microscope long enough. Both gubernatorial candidates appear to favor competitive markets, although it is not clear how far either would go toward endorsing significant market changes at this juncture. It does not appear that the positions of the individual Commissioners on competitive markets have changed, either. Rather, it appears that circumstances outside their control have forced them to take the practical road for now.

So what does the future hold? The answer is, it depends. As is so often the case, policy in this area is dictated by reactions to current events. It depends on how volatile the retail markets become, and to a lesser extent, the cause of that volatility; it depends on who wins the race for governor, and the makeup of the Commission; and it depends on the marketers deciding to remain in Pennsylvania and staying engaged in the process. This last factor may be the most important.

PUC To Consider Revised Labeling Requirements for Electricity Suppliers

The Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) recently issued a Tentative Order in the matter of: The Use of Fixed Price Labels for Products With a Pass-Through Clause, Docket No. M-2013-2362961 (Tentative Order entered May 23, 2013), in which it requested interested parties to comment on what it views as an emerging problem: certain Electric Generation Suppliers (“EGS”) offering products labeled as “fixed price” when the products clearly are “variable price” products.  Comments were filed June 24 and a PUC decision is expected soon.


A number of EGSs recently have begun offering longer-term products (3-7 years) under the label of a “fixed price” despite the fact that the products contain “pass-through” clauses that allow those EGSs to substantially increase the overall price customers are asked to pay, without notice.  Such contracts often have substantial early termination fees, effectively trapping customers who are unhappy about unexpected increases.  The typical pass-through clause does not permit the EGS to increase the commodity price component, but does allow increases to track changes in transmission charges, reliability charges, etc., and which substantially lessen the risk of long term contracts for those EGSs, by placing that risk on the customer.

In its Tentative Order, the PUC expressed concern that customers could be misled into believing that the products were fixed price; that the price was indeed fixed for the life of the contract, and that customers would not pay attention to the fact that their price could rise over the contract period of time, and that even if the customers did pay attention, they would be helpless to do anything.  Moreover, those suppliers who have abided by the Commission’s rules–which require that a product offered as a fixed-price product be a fixed-price product—are continuing to be competitively disadvantaged, because customers are attracted to these misleadingly lower-priced offers.

A number of parties submitted comments.  The parties can be divided into two groups.  The first group, exemplified by First Energy Solutions (“FES”), believes that offering a product as “fixed price” when it contains a substantial pass-through clause is perfectly acceptable and that the Commission should not be permitted to regulate the words used to describe these products, as that would constitute impermissible rate regulation.  It should be no surprise that FES has been actively offering these pass-through products.

On the other side of the debate are the “playing by the rules” suppliers, such as Dominion Retail, who believe that labeling a product as fixed price when it contains an expansive pass-through clause which could result in substantial price increases to customers is, at best, a matter of false advertising.   Dominion and others are gravely concerned that changing the rules to allow for such contracts to be labeled as anything other than variable price contracts could leave customers with no ability to assess the basis for those charges, to understand the risks associated with such charges or to adjust their behavior (including leaving the contract without substantial penalty) in the event of a price hike.  These commenters believe that any product labeled as fixed must be fixed for the initial term of the contract.  To do otherwise will lead to substantial customer dissatisfaction and further disaffection with the competitive market.  The PUC is expected to issue an order by the end of summer.

For Pennsylvania’s energy markets to mature, suppliers need to adopt sustainable marketing techniques that foster the long-term best interests of the market.  If the marketers will not police themselves and curb this type of behavior, it is clear that the Commission will come under increasing pressure to do so, from the public and the General Assembly.  Making questionable offers to customers results in negative attitudes about competitive markets and is a sure way to endanger the gains that have been achieved in Pennsylvania to date.

PUC en banc Hearing: A Resounding Success

The PA PUC’s recent public hearing to explore the future of the competitive electricity markets in Pennsylvania was no less than a resounding success according to Chairman Robert Powelson of the Commission.

On June 9, 2011, four panels of witnesses provided testimony before all five Commissioners sitting en banc.  The witnesses included Former Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection, John Hanger; Chairman of the Texas Public Utilities Commission, Barry Smitherman; the Chief Executive Officers of all Pennsylvania’s electric distribution companies; and a number of representatives of electric generation suppliers operating in the Commonwealth.  As expected, the witnesses representing “consumer” interests testified that the existing market structure and performance are well within acceptable limits.  As part of his concluding remarks, however, Chairman Powelson responded to those contentions, stating that “the status quo is not an option.”  Also notable was that  the CEOs of each of Pennsylvania’s electric distribution companies agreed (some more than others) with Chairman Powelson’s suggestion that the best use of the talents of the EDCs is to be “infrastructure companies,” rather than default suppliers, assuming the opportunity for an orderly transition out of the default service business.

There were a number of other constructive proposals for near term changes that could be made to the electricity markets to make robust competition more likely, short of requiring the electric utilities to exit the merchant function, though most would require legislative change.  John Hanger, himself a former PUC commissioner, had a number of excellent suggestions, including requiring new customers to affirmatively choose a supplier out of a list of suppliers that may include default service as an option.  This same requirement would apply to customers who move within a service territory or who are disconnected for whatever reason.

Comments have been filed by well over twenty (20) parties not including those that testified, which shows a tremendous amount of interest in the development of competition in Pennsylvania’s electricity markets on a going forward basis.  The Commission expects to hold at least one more en banc hearing, possibly two, to thoroughly vet all of the ideas before reaching any final decisions.