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Energy retailer asks Maryland Supreme Court to reconsider the Maryland Public Service Commission’s re-writing of the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act

On March 31, 2021, the Public Service Commission of Maryland (Commission) issued Order No. 89795 which proposed to drastically re-write the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act (MTSA) and, if permitted to stand, may fundamentally change the way business is conducted in the state. In Order 89795, the Commission was resolving a complaint filed by Commission staff against SmartEnergy, a Maryland retail energy supplier. The complaint alleged that SmartEnergy engaged in false and misleading advertising in connection with a mailing solicitation campaign that resulted in consumers calling SmartEnergy to sign up for the service advertised in the mailed postcards, and then subsequently becoming disgruntled with the service or the terms. Ultimately, the Commission found SmartEnergy had violated the MTSA and imposed penalties and sanctions, but Order 89795’s re-writing of the MTSA has much broader implications than just the issues and interests alleged in the complaint.

The MTSA is a consumer protection law that was enacted to protect Marylanders from telemarketers and merchants cold-calling and enrolling unsuspecting consumers into vague and un-memorialized contracts over the phone. Maryland law tasks the state’s attorney general with enforcing the state’s consumer protection laws, so there is a threshold question in this case of whether the Commission even has jurisdiction to apply and enforce the MTSA. Even if it does, in order for the MTSA to apply to a phone call between a merchant and a consumer, the solicitation call must occur “entirely” over the phone and be “initiated” by the merchant. The Commission’s Order in the SmartEnergy case seems to write out the prerequisites for the MTSA to apply. The Commission found that SmartEnergy’s solicitation started with the mailing campaign and that consumers called SmartEnergy in response to the postcards it sent. By the Commission’s own findings of facts, while part of SmartEnergy’s solicitation attempts, including consummation of the contract, occurred over the telephone, SmartEnergy’s “entire” sales attempt did not occur via telephone; similarly, it was the consumer, not SmartEnergy, that “initiated” the call and so, on its face, it is difficult to reconcile how SmartEnergy’s phone conversations are subject to the MTSA. Additionally, for calls that fall under the MTSA, in order to comply with the law, merchants are required to provide follow-up written contracts that lay out terms of the agreement. SmartEnergy provided written terms to the consumers that signed up for its service, but the Commission found the follow-up communications were insufficient.

The implications of the Commission’s Order are significant. If a consumer calls a merchant of goods or services to place an order or schedule an appointment – think take-out food or calls to the doctor, a lawyer, or a plumber – and a contract is formed over the telephone, under the Commission’s interpretation that phone conversation is subject to the MTSA. It means that to order a pizza, the pizza parlor is going to be required to provide a written contract with the terms and conditions for the take-out order memorialized. It will construct new barriers for Marylanders to conduct everyday business.

For these reasons, SmartEnergy has petitioned the Maryland Supreme Court to hear its case and revisit the Commission’s Order (and the appellate courts that affirmed the Order). Several amicus briefs have been filed in support of SmartEnergy’s request for the court to hear its case; a decision by the court about whether to hear the case is expected in the coming months. The case is In the Matter of SmartEnergy Holdings, LLC d/b/a SmartEnergy, Case No. SCM-PET-0363-2022.

“Tip Letter” and Records Related to Investigation Leading to PUC-Approved Settlement Not Subject to Disclosure

The PUC is not required to disclose a utility employee’s “tip letter” or other records relating to an investigation of the utility’s practices where the documents are not considered by the Commissioners when approving the resulting settlement.

A panel of the Commonwealth Court has held that documents relating to a settled, informal investigation of a utility by the PUC’s Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement (I&E) are not subject to disclosure under either section 335(d) of the Public Utility Code or the provisions of Right to Know Law (RTKL), where the documents are not provided to or considered by the commissioners.  The opinion in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Seder, No. 2132 C.D. 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 3, 2014), reverses orders by the Office of Open Records directing the PUC to provide news reporters and their publications with access to an anonymous “tip letter” from a purported PPL employee and other documents relating to the resulting I&E informal investigation of the utility.  As the court itself acknowledged, its construction of section 335(d) and the RTKL allows the parties to a PUC settlement “great leeway in determining which documents are subject to public disclosure.”

The court considered the requirements of section 335(d) and the RTKL in turn.  Under section 335(d), the PUC must disclose documents related to an investigation of a public utility if (1) the commission has made a decision, entered into a settlement or taken any other official action under the Sunshine Act, and (2) the commission relied on the documents in question when doing so. 66 Pa. C.S. § 335(d).  The key question before the court was who constitutes the “commission” in the context of section 335(d):  the commissioners themselves, or the entirety of the PUC, including I&E.  Conceding that the statute is not a model of clarity, the court determined that “commission” means only the commissioners themselves, because they alone are entitled, by majority vote, to make the decisions, enter into the settlements and take the other official actions that are the subject of section 335(d).  The first prerequisite to disclosure was satisfied when the PUC approved the settlement with PPL, but the second was not, because the commissioners did not have access to or rely upon the “tip letter” or other documents when deciding to enter into the settlement.

The court then held that the requested documents are also exempt from public access under section 708(b)(17) of the RTKL, which exempts agency records relating to noncriminal investigations, including complaints, investigative materials, records containing the identity of a confidential source, and records containing information made confidential by law.  65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(17)(i)-(iv).  The “tip letter” is exempt from disclosure because it was the basis for I&E’s institution of an informal investigation.  The remaining documents are exempt because they were created or collected as part of an informal investigation to determine compliance with regulations.  The court reasoned that to require the PUC to disclose the requested documents could lead to public utilities and employees being less likely to provide information out of fear of retaliation or public embarrassment, thus “frustrating the purpose of [the] PUC’s investigations and lessening the effectiveness of the PUC in monitoring the utilities’ compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.”  (The court concluded with a separate determination that a legal memorandum prepared by an I&E prosecuting attorney analyzing whether the allegations against PPL violated the Public Utility Code is legally privileged and therefore also exempt from disclosure.)

A copy of Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Seder, No. 2132 C.D. 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct.  Dec. 3, 2014) is available here.

Columbia Gas Files for $37.8 million Rate Increase

After only a few months of collecting the newly increased rates from its 2010 Rate Case, Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania is back before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission seeking an additional $37.8 million in annual revenue.

Columbia’s January 14, 2011 filing is notable for more than the timing of the filing, however.  Columbia has proposed a distribution system improvement charge, often referred-to as a “DSIC”.  The DSIC, which has been held to be unavailable to natural gas utilities under 66 Pa C.S. § 1307(a), would allow Columbia to collected a return of and a return on its investment in plant–between base rate cases–by means of a surcharge mechanism.  Columbia also has proposed a levelized distribution charge that would allow it to collect the costs of operating its system on a non-volumetric basis.  This concept is known as de-coupling.  Columbia argues in its filing that without decoupling, its revenue stream is tied to volumes of gas delivered, which are subject to variance for reasons beyond the control of the Company; while at the same time, its operating costs are unrelated to the volume of gas delivered. Columbia argues that the current rate methodology puts the company at risk, and therefore, Columbia seeks to de-couple its revenue stream from the volume delivered, providing it with far more stable revenues.  Rate requests of this magnitude are nearly always  suspended and investigated  for seven months by an order of the Commission issued under, 66 Pa. C.S. § 1308(d), and this case will most likely be assigned to an Administrative Law Judge for hearings.