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Energy retailer asks Maryland Supreme Court to reconsider the Maryland Public Service Commission’s re-writing of the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act

On March 31, 2021, the Public Service Commission of Maryland (Commission) issued Order No. 89795 which proposed to drastically re-write the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act (MTSA) and, if permitted to stand, may fundamentally change the way business is conducted in the state. In Order 89795, the Commission was resolving a complaint filed by Commission staff against SmartEnergy, a Maryland retail energy supplier. The complaint alleged that SmartEnergy engaged in false and misleading advertising in connection with a mailing solicitation campaign that resulted in consumers calling SmartEnergy to sign up for the service advertised in the mailed postcards, and then subsequently becoming disgruntled with the service or the terms. Ultimately, the Commission found SmartEnergy had violated the MTSA and imposed penalties and sanctions, but Order 89795’s re-writing of the MTSA has much broader implications than just the issues and interests alleged in the complaint.

The MTSA is a consumer protection law that was enacted to protect Marylanders from telemarketers and merchants cold-calling and enrolling unsuspecting consumers into vague and un-memorialized contracts over the phone. Maryland law tasks the state’s attorney general with enforcing the state’s consumer protection laws, so there is a threshold question in this case of whether the Commission even has jurisdiction to apply and enforce the MTSA. Even if it does, in order for the MTSA to apply to a phone call between a merchant and a consumer, the solicitation call must occur “entirely” over the phone and be “initiated” by the merchant. The Commission’s Order in the SmartEnergy case seems to write out the prerequisites for the MTSA to apply. The Commission found that SmartEnergy’s solicitation started with the mailing campaign and that consumers called SmartEnergy in response to the postcards it sent. By the Commission’s own findings of facts, while part of SmartEnergy’s solicitation attempts, including consummation of the contract, occurred over the telephone, SmartEnergy’s “entire” sales attempt did not occur via telephone; similarly, it was the consumer, not SmartEnergy, that “initiated” the call and so, on its face, it is difficult to reconcile how SmartEnergy’s phone conversations are subject to the MTSA. Additionally, for calls that fall under the MTSA, in order to comply with the law, merchants are required to provide follow-up written contracts that lay out terms of the agreement. SmartEnergy provided written terms to the consumers that signed up for its service, but the Commission found the follow-up communications were insufficient.

The implications of the Commission’s Order are significant. If a consumer calls a merchant of goods or services to place an order or schedule an appointment – think take-out food or calls to the doctor, a lawyer, or a plumber – and a contract is formed over the telephone, under the Commission’s interpretation that phone conversation is subject to the MTSA. It means that to order a pizza, the pizza parlor is going to be required to provide a written contract with the terms and conditions for the take-out order memorialized. It will construct new barriers for Marylanders to conduct everyday business.

For these reasons, SmartEnergy has petitioned the Maryland Supreme Court to hear its case and revisit the Commission’s Order (and the appellate courts that affirmed the Order). Several amicus briefs have been filed in support of SmartEnergy’s request for the court to hear its case; a decision by the court about whether to hear the case is expected in the coming months. The case is In the Matter of SmartEnergy Holdings, LLC d/b/a SmartEnergy, Case No. SCM-PET-0363-2022.

U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on line between FERC and States when it comes to demand response programs.

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court in a majority decision reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision and determined that a regional transmission organization’s (RTO) demand response program compensation comes under FERC’s jurisdiction. A demand response program is when, during high electricity demand, customers of electricity are paid not to use electricity. These demand response programs serve to lower electricity prices and increase the reliability of the electric grid. Center to the present issue is FERC’s issuance of Order No. 745 (Order 745). Order 745 requires market operators to pay the same price to demand response providers for conserving energy as to the generators for making energy. The D.C. Circuit Court held that FERC lacked authority to issue the order because Order 745 would directly regulate retail electricity rates. The D.C. Circuit Court also held that FERC’s demand response compensation scheme was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.

The U.S. Supreme Court opinion, written by Justice Kagan, cited the FPA which authorizes FERC to regulate the “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce including both wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice ‘affecting’ such rates.” F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-840, 2016 WL 280888 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016), citing §§ 824(b), 824e (a). The Court also stated that the FPA leaves any retail sale of electricity to the States alone. The Court noted that this division creates a “steady flow” of jurisdictional disputes. Id.

On its way to clarifying the authoritative division between FERC and States, the Court adopted an earlier D.C. Circuit decision which found that FERC’s jurisdiction lies with rules and practices that “directly affect the wholesale rate.” Id. The Court stressed the “directly” in this determination by explaining that a “non-hyperliteral reading is needed to prevent the statute from assuming near-infinite breadth.” Id. The Court further reasoned that FERC’s Order 745 does in fact directly affect wholesale rates because demand response bids in competitive auctions balance wholesale supply and demand and thereby set the prices. Id. Because demand response programs are all about reducing wholesale rates and so too the rules and practices that determine how these programs operate, they fit, “with room to spare,” the definition of directly affecting wholesale rates. Id. This is true because RTOs only accept demand response bids if and only if the bids displace higher-priced generation.

The Court not only decided that demand response programs as well as the compensation that drives them is within FERC’s jurisdiction, but also that such jurisdiction does not intrude on the States authority to regulate retail rates. Here, the Court determined that, although demand response programs have “consequences at the retail level”, when FERC regulates the wholesale market then no matter the effect on retail rates the FPA imposes no bar. Id.

Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, saying that they would agree with the majority if not for the FPA’s definition of “wholesale” which under their determination bars FERC’s Order 745. The FPA’s definition of “wholesale” is “a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.” Id. citing § 824(b). Because the majority of demand-response participants are end users, the dissent states that the demand response program does not fit the wholesale definition and hence is outside FERC jurisdiction.

Both the majority and dissent rely on “wholesale” as the pivotal word in determining jurisdiction. The majority finds that those practices that directly impact wholesale prices come under FERC’s jurisdiction, the dissent only practices that impact wholesale customers – those reselling energy. Yesterday’s decision secures FERC’s authority to regulate not only wholesale rates, but the programs and incentives that affect them.

Attorney-Client Privilege: A Two Way Street

Bringing welcome clarity for regulated entities, especially those that rely heavily on in-house legal teams whose members interact on a day-to-day basis with business decision makers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court this week reversed the Superior Court’s narrow “client to lawyer” limitation on the attorney-client privilege and held that the privilege operates “in a two-way fashion to protect confidential client-to-attorney or attorney-to-client communications made for the purpose of obtaining or providing professional legal advice.” Gillard v. AIG Insurance Co., _A.3d ___(Pa. 2011) (10 EAP 2010; filed February 23, 2011) (Saylor, J.).

Gillard involved a bad faith suit arising out of defendant insurance companies’ handling of an uninsured motorist claim. The plaintiff sought production of “all documents from the file” of the law firm representing the insurers in the action that gave rise to the bad faith claim. The insurers redacted some documents and withheld others, asserting attorney-client privilege. The trial judge ruled that the privilege did not apply to any documents that were communications from attorney to client, and the Superior Court affirmed.

Under the lower courts’ narrow “client only” approach, legal advice and proactive observations made by in-house lawyers, which often could reveal privileged facts and observations about the client and its business, were left unprotected. Recognizing the “difficulty of unraveling attorney advice from client input,” a task necessitated by the Superior Court’s narrow view of the privilege, Justice Saylor’s 5-justice majority opinion emphasizes the imprudence of adopting a general rule that would require disclosure of “communications which likely would not exist (at least in their present form) but for the participants’ understanding that the interchange was to remain private.” Justices Eakin and McCaffery filed separate dissenting opinions.

A link to the Supreme Court’s opinions can be found here.

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-58-2010mo.pdf

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-58-2010do1.pdf

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-58-2010do2.pdf